First Flight 447 Victim Buried in Rio: Daily

By Ben Tavener, Senior Contributing Reporter

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – The body of Nelson Marinho Filho, who died when Air France flight 447 plunged into the Atlantic Ocean on June 1, 2009, has been buried in Rio – the first formal burial since a major salvage attempt was completed in June this year.

The burial of Air France flight 447 victim Nelson Marinho Filho took place in Jardim da Saudade cemetery in the west of Rio

The burial of Air France flight 447 victim Nelson Marinho Filho took place in Jardim da Saudade cemetery in the west of Rio, image recreation.

Nelson Filho’s body is one of 104 recovered from the water in the operation, and is one of eighteen Brazilians to have been identified so far, whose remains began arriving in Brazil at the weekend.

They are all expected to be buried by the end of the next week.

At the funeral his father, Nelson Marinho, who is also president of the Flight AF 447 Victims’ Families Association, said that although burying his son brought “some closure”, the struggle continues.

He says he refuses to believe that the accident was due to human error when a further six A330s have fallen from the skies since AF 447, and this year asked for a parallel investigation conducted by Brazil into the tragedy.

Investigations into the incident are still ongoing, but it is thought the aircraft stalled after climbing too high.

Air France flight 447 was flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris on June 1, 2009, when it fell into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 people on board.

Read more (in Portuguese).

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4 Responses to "First Flight 447 Victim Buried in Rio: Daily"

  1. charles james  December 6, 2011 at 10:00 AM

    AF 447 did not stall because it “flew too high”. AF 447 flew into catastrophic thunderstorm conditions, probably encountering a combination of icy rain and horrendous tailwinds and powerful downdrafts. It was these flight conditions that probably caused the mid-air stall. The black box data indicates that the flight crew reacted incorrectly to the stall situation. They should have increased the engines thrust to maximum and lowered the nose and gone into a controlled descent in an attempt to gain airspeed and restore lift to the flight surfaces. What they did instead, and as it turned out fatally incorrectly, was to lift the nose and attempt to climb, which only aggravated the stall conditions. AF 447 crashed because they flew into extremely dangerous weather conditions, and then they reacted incorrectly to the stall scenario that the weather probably caused.

  2. John  December 6, 2011 at 2:17 PM

    Air France 447 crashed because there were two inexperienced copilots on the flight deck who were not trained in high altitude conditions and stalls. The plane was telling them STALL, STALL, STALL repeatedly and not once was it acknowledged they were in a stalled position. Instead they pulled up which piloting 101 will tell you is a dangerous thing to do. Ice was a factor since it probably blocked the speed sensors. But that in itself wasn’t deadly. It was the improper reaction that caused the plane to hit the water belly first on that fateful night in the middle of the Atlantic. The latest BEA reports list the weather as a minor factor and the human reaction as the major factor.

  3. Pingback: Final Air France Flight 447 Crash Report:Daily Update | The Rio Times | Brazil News

  4. Nalliah Thayabharan  August 1, 2012 at 9:34 PM

    The accident was caused by the co-pilot induced stalled glide condition and remained in that condition until impact. To recover from stall is to set engine to idle to reduce nose up side effect and try full nose down input. If no success roll the aircraft to above 60° bank angle and rudder input to lower the nose in a steep engaged turn. Pilots lack of familiarity and training along with system malfunction contributed to this terrible accident. Also the following contributed to the accident
    (1)the absence of proper immediate actions to correct the stalled glide
    (2) Insufficient and inappropriate situation awareness disabling the co-pilots and the captain to become aware of what was happening regarding the performance and behaviour of the aircraft
    (3)lack of effective communication between the co-pilots and the captain which limited the decision making processes, the ability to choose appropriate alternatives and establish priorities in the actions to counter the stalled glide
    During most of its long descent into the Atlantic Ocean, Airbus A330-203 was in a stalled glide. Far from a deep stall, this seems to have been a conventional stall in which the Airbus A330-203 displayed exemplary behavior. The aircraft responded to roll inputs, maintained the commanded pitch attitude, and neither departed nor spun. The only thing the Airbus A330-203 failed to do well was to make clear to its cockpit crew what was going on.Its pitch attitude was about 15 degrees nose up and its flight path was around 25 degrees downward, giving an angle of attack of 35 degrees or more. Its vertical speed was about 100 knots, and its true airspeed was about 250 knots. It remained in this unusual attitude not because it could not recover, but because the co-pilots did not comprehend in darkness, the actual attitude of the aircraft. The co-pilots held the nose up. If the co-pilots had pushed the stick forward, held it there, and manually retrimmed the stabilizer, the airplane would have recovered from the stall and flown normally.

    Air France complained that the copilots did not have enough time to analyze the situation. Gravitational stalled glide does not allow timeouts, to thoroughly discuss the situation to find out what went wrong. The co-pilots – 37 year old David Robert and 32 year old Pierre-Cédric Bonin missed the cardinal rule that first they must fly the airplane, and after start analyzing the situation, since a falling airplane is not going to wait for them. If they did not understand the instruments, then instead of pondering on it they should have come to the quick conclusion that they did not understand those instruments, and apply the unreliable airspeed procedure clearly prescribed for that situation, which is a blind, given thrust and pitch setting for the given configuration, and let the airplane fly itself, and only after get to analyzing what went wrong, and by the time they finished, the root-cause (pitot icing) would have probably cured itself. It was the safe solution to the problem, but not applied.
    The Airbus A330 performed exactly as it was designed and described when the stall warning cut out at the end of valid values, except the co-pilots did not know it. Unfortunately, it happens too often with catastrophic results that pilots are not familiar with the systems of their own airplane, such as in the case of American Airlines 587 over Queens, which was clearly the airline’s fault.
    Air France also argued that the stall warning system in the A330 is too “confusing”. Every modern airplane is quite a confusing piece of machinery. It is full of buttons, levers, all kinds of red, yellow, green lights with buzzers, and a host of other indicators and controls inside, which can look very confusing indeed, but it is the pilot’s duty to reign on them, or not to be pilot.
    Airbus A330-203 is a new generation, highly automated piece of equipment with drastically simplified controls, displays, and instrumentation compared to older models. Still, pilots with the same human capabilities as the ones on Air France flight 447 could very well stay in full control in those planes, and many times acted heroically saving situations much graver than where the plight of Air France flight 447 started, such as United Airlines flight UA232 at Sioux City, or Air Canada flight AC143, the Gimli Glider. If those pilots could perform well in those older, much more complicated aircraft in tougher situations, then there is no excuse for the co-pilots of AF flight 447 to be confused in a generally much simpler and easier-to-fly aircraft.
    The Airbus A320 is a digital fly-by-wire aircraft as the flight control surfaces are moved by electrical and hydraulic actuators controlled by a digital computer. The computer interprets pilot commands via input from a side-stick, making adjustments on its own to keep the plane stable and on course, which is particularly useful after engine failure by allowing the pilots to concentrate on engine restart and landing planning. Some say the Airbus A330 is a “video-game” airplane due to its side-stick control, which does not match up in real hard situations. But who can say that after the successful ditching of US Airways flight 1549 on the Hudson River? It was an Airbus A320 with the same side-stick control, and it matched up with the hardest situation very well with an experienced 57 year old Captain Chesley Sullenberger at the command. The Airbus A330 is not a video-game airplane, it is the airlines that make it a video-game by cutting corners, taking advantage of its superior automated capabilities thinking that it flies by itself, and no training and no knowledge of even the basics of the principles of flying is required in them for their pilots, as was demonstrated by the co-pilots of flight 447, who seemed to be incapable to react even on a basic level to the phenomenon of the aerodynamic stall. The co-pilots had not applied the unreliable airspeed procedure. The co-pilots apparently did not notice that the plane had reached its maximum permissible altitude. The co-pilots did not read out the available data like vertical velocity, altitude, etc. The stall warning sounded continuously for 54 seconds. The absence of any training, at high altitude, in manual airplane handling and in the procedure for ”Vol avec IAS douteuse” (Flight with questionable Indicated Airspeed) caused this terrible accident. Evidently, it might not be what Airbus had on its mind designing the aircraft. They might have meant the best of the both, an airplane with superior controls, matched with seasoned pilots with superior education in the principles of flying and the handling of hard situations, best of the best, as airlines are prone to boast of their flying personnel, to represent quality improvement in flying safety by this pairing. Now, if this piece of equipment falls in the hands of the airlines who use it as a video game to save training costs, telling only their pilots that “if the red light on the right side blinks, just pull the stick back as hard as you can, and let the system do the rest”, they can get away with it as long as everything is normal, the airplane is good enough for that, but in unforeseeable situations, such as the flight 447 en-route to Paris on that night, without any independent knowledge of flying in general, the video-gaming with the aircraft may ultimately come to a fatal end.
    However, beyond the reasoning and explanations there is still some eeriness about the crash, taking in consideration that Air France flight 447’s pilots just sat there in daze squeezing the control stick, barely being able to do more than commenting on how the airplane was falling out of the sky until crashing into the Atlantic Ocean, the arrival of the 58-year-old flight captain Marc Dubois in the cockpit not making much a difference either. The question might arise whether weren’t the pilots in a mentally incapacitating state of shock and disbelief? Whether do or can Air France test pilots of how well they can keep their mental stability under the duress of a catastrophic situation? None of it seems to be the fault of the Airbus A330, which needs only good, trained pilots to give superior performance for the good of the flying public. Very similarly 3 decades ago Captain Madan Kukar’s mistaken perception of the Air India Flight 855 situation resulted in causing the Boeing 747-237 to rapidly lose altitude and the airplane hit the Arabian Sea at 35 degree nose-down angle.
    Practicing recovery from “Loss of Control” situations and improve flight crew training for high altitude stalls (simulator training usually has low altitude stalls which are significantly different due to energy status of the aircraft) should become the mandatory part of recurrent training.

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