Mexico’s president proposes new Latin American order

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – It has taken almost 3 years in office, but Andrés Manuel López Obrador has finally addressed Latin America.

“The proposal is nothing less than to build something similar to the European Union, but attached to our history, our reality and our identities. In this spirit, replacing the OAS with a truly autonomous body, not anyone’s lackey, should not be ruled out,” the Mexican president said on July 24 on Simón Bolívar’s birthday, concurrent with the meeting of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) foreign ministers, at which he delivered a speech uncommon for a president who has not visited any of his counterparts in the region and who since his inauguration in December 2018 has maintained that “the best foreign policy is the internal one.”

The political moment has placed Mexico at the heart of the regional stage: spearheading a joint reaction to the pandemic, putting to the test its power to convene the meeting of CELAC heads of state to be held in the country next September, and emerging as a potential host for negotiations on the Venezuelan crisis, a fact that seems imminent, lacking only its official announcement. Discretion in foreign policy is over, at least for now.

“The motto ‘America for the Americans’ has just disintegrated the peoples of our continent,” López Obrador said at Chapultepec Castle, the same place where the peace agreement that ended El Salvador’s civil war was signed in 1992, after Mexican mediation – a fact omitted from the presidential speech.

“There is only one special case, that of Cuba, the country that for over half a century has asserted its independence by politically standing up to the United States. We can agree or disagree with the Cuban Revolution and its government, but to have resisted for 62 years without submission is quite an achievement,” he said following the massive protests in early July on the island-state.

Mexico sent two ships with food and medical supplies to Cuba at the explicit request of President Miguel Díaz-Canel. “I maintain that it is time for a new coexistence among all the countries of America, because the model imposed over two centuries ago is exhausted, it has no future or way out, it no longer benefits anyone. We have to settle the dilemma of whether to integrate with the United States or to oppose it defensively,” the Mexican president stated. “We are not a protectorate, a colony or their backyard,” he added.

Those most enthusiastic about López Obrador’s speech were the governments of Venezuela and Cuba, but the Mexican’s speech also aroused some reservations, as within the Colombian Chancellery, and led to telling silences, as in the case of Brazil.

Irrespective of the media noise for the support to Cuba and the barbs against the OAS, international relations expert Natalia Saltalamacchia highlights an unusual geopolitical reading in López Obrador’s public positions. “The novelty is that he presented, in simple and clear language, a perspective on what awaits Latin America in the era of the dispute for hegemony between China and the United States,” says the academic at the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico.

The message is that it is in Mexico’s interest that the U.S. be strong, but at the same time insisting on the need to review the relationship terms for the continent to work better: greater political autonomy and better economic cooperation. The main uncertainty is how this new continental order would be reflected in concrete terms.

Retired diplomat Ernesto Campos notes that the idea is not new, as it has been unsuccessfully advocated by figures such as Lula and Hugo Chávez. “I don’t see an environment in which to transform the OAS or to create a new body,” Campos says, who has represented Mexico in several countries in the region and headed the Foreign Ministry’s Latin America Department.

The CELAC, a grouping supported by the Mexican government, has weighty absences, such as Brazil, in addition to the obvious ones, the U.S. and Canada. “It’s a very successful discourse,” Campos says, “but it’s not possible to have a real talk without considering the three countries with the largest territorial extension and the two most populous.” The political capital to push an issue that does not seem to be a priority for the White House and the time López Obrador has left in office, just over three years, do not seem sufficient.

Replacing the OAS sounds easy, but the two experts consulted agree that dismantling this institutional structure would not be feasible.

Internally, López Obrador is characterized by decapitating organizations that, from his perspective, are irrelevant, corrupt, or dysfunctional. But the OAS is not just an ornament – it includes the Inter-American System of Human Rights, for example, which acts as the last barrier against dictatorships, state assassinations, and violations of individual guarantees.

“The proposal is perhaps due to a profound ignorance of what the organization does,” Campos argues. Treating the OAS as the former U.S. ministry of colonies is mostly part of the existing dispute between the Mexican Foreign Ministry and Luis Almagro, the OAS secretary general. “The fact that the third largest contributor wants to eliminate the body says more about the OAS secretary-general’s mismanagement than about the sender of the message,” Saltalamacchia argues.

Along with the conflict with Almagro, the Mexican government has carefully chosen its battles, with the wild card of the principle of non-intervention under its sleeve. It has been vocal in its support for the Cuban Revolution, true to Mexico’s diplomatic tradition, and has also raised its voice against the vilification of Evo Morales in Bolivia. More cautiously, it criticized Daniel Ortega’s repression in Nicaragua, but was elusive about the government of Nicolás Maduro.

“It’s a very casuistic application of the principle of non-intervention, practically convenience,” Campos notes. “It was an excuse to say little,” Saltalamacchia adds.

According to the Mexican perspective, being categorical about Venezuela has more costs than benefits. But to talk about a regional leader is to talk about a country that, in addition to leading and attracting sympathy, is willing to bear costs. It is unclear if Mexico will take on this role, with all its burdens and bonuses.

It is true that thanks to the equidistance it has kept between Maduro and his opponents, it has the chance to exercise a certain protagonism, with benefits conditioned on the success or failure of negotiations. However, Mexico’s role in the process – whether it will mediate or simply facilitate the talks – has yet to be spelled out.

What has changed for Mexico to have taken the initiative? One assumption is that the López Obrador government’s desire for discretion was ultimately disrupted by a context in which it was unable to close in on itself.

“There is an international reality imposing itself,” says Saltalamacchia. The other part is explained by an internal factor: the insistence of Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard, who at the beginning of the presidential term seemed confined to a very limited space and who took advantage of the pandemic to reinforce his political capital and his protagonism with the aim of building a presidential candidacy in 2024.

Suddenly, the country which had been looking mainly inward, has a chance to take the initiative and participate in the most relevant regional political events until the end of this year.

Source: El Pais